A Comparison of Noxious Facilities' Impact for Home Owners versus Renters
INTRODUCTION
Attempts to site noxious facilities frequently face intense opposition from local residents. Over the past two decades, economists have applied several alternative techniques to estimate public willingness to pay to avoid proximity to such facilities. One of the more successful techniques is the hedonic approach, which identifies the portion of any property value and/or wage differentials associated with a variety of local characteristics. This approach has been employed in several studies to estimate the impact that existing facilities have on local residents. (Kohlhase, 1991; Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn, 1988; Clark and Nieves, 1994) Of the studies focusing on the housing market, most examine the impacts on home owners. However, generalizing hedonic impacts from home owners to renters may be problematic. For example, one hedonic study by Linneman (1980) examines differences in the valuation of site characteristics for separate samples of owner-occupants and renters. Although Linneman does not examine noxious facilities specifically, be does find that both the signs and significance levels of various location-specific characteristics vary by housing tenure category (Le. owners vs. renters). We believe that there are compelling theoretical reasons why renters and home owners may have different responses to noxious facilities.
First, due to differences in their demographic characteristics, the two groups may have different aversions to the hazards associated with the facilities. Attitudes toward environmental risks have been found to be associated with individual characteristics such as education, income, sex, and age. For example, studies of risk perceptions of complex technology or environmental threats that have used U.S. population samples have generally found a greater intensity of risk perception among females than males. Analyzing attitudes of males and females separately, Mitchell (1984) found that having children under the age of 18 further increased risk perception for women but not for men. Findings related to other demographic characteristics have not I been totally consistent across surveys, but, overall, the intensity of risk perception tends to be lower among older and among more highly-educated segments of the population.
Second, there appear to be differences between owners and renters in levels of concern for environmental hazards, though previous studies are not d e f~t i v e because they have not controlled for other demographic characteristics. An interesting study by Cutter (1981) explores the relationship between residents' concern with environmental pollution, demographic characteristics, and measures of the occurrence of hazards in each Census tract. She finds that concern increases significantly with the rate of hazard occurrence in the local community and that renters, African-Americans, and lower-income groups have higher levels of concern. A more recent study by Howe (199oa, 199Ob) examines relationships between four different indices of environmental concern and detailed demographic variables. While regional differences in responses were evident, women and persons with children under 18 were generally more concerned with environmental and health risks. Higher levels of concern were also found among those who were younger and less welleducated, and among renters. These findings suggest that differences in measured responses to environmental hazards may result from unmeasured factors associated with housing tenure status.
A tIriid factor which may generate differences in rates at which local amenities are capitalized into property values and wages for home owners or for renters is the differential mobility of the two groups. If the transactions costs associated with moving are higher for owners, then relatively lower mobility for owner-occupants, as compared to renters, can result in different marginal valuations on noxious facilities. For example, highly mobile individuals may be more responsive to slight interregional variations in amenities than their less mobile counterparts. This suggests that small impacts may not be detectable if moving costs are high. In fact, Boehm (1981) and more recently, Boehm, Herzog and Schlottmann (1991) have shown that mobility, both within and between metropolitan areas, is interrelated with tenure choice. Households that anticipate a move in the near term are less likely to choose to be owners. Furthermore, Israeli and Nelson 4 .
(1W) find that owners have an expected residence duration (1 1.3 years) that is more than four times that of renters (2.4 years).
In this study, we employ an interregional framework in an hedonic analysis of both wage and property markets to examine the impacts of eight different noxious facility types. Annual wage and housing expenditure equations are estimated separately for owners and for renters to derive separate implicit price estimates for the two groups. Our fmdings suggest differences in the magnitude but not the sign of implicit prices for owners and renters. Furthermore, the differences do not just reflect dissimilarity in the mobility or demographic characteristics of the two groups, since the divergence of implicit prices between owners and renters decreases by only a small margin when mobility and demographics are controlled. F m y , although differences in magnitude have been identified, no consistent patterns distinguishing owners from renters emerge.
OVERVlEW OF IBDONIC MODEL
There are numerous examples of hedonic studies which examine the intracity variation in either property values or rents resulting from noxious facilities.' However, noxious facility impacts can also be derived using an intercity 3edonic frame~orl?,~ and the intercity model may offer some distinct advantages.
The intercity model examines the joint impact of site-specific characteristics on both local wages and land rents. Roback (1982) and later Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) show that implicit prices can be derived from the wage differential and land rent effects associated with various levels of site-specific characteristics.
Cropper and Arriaga-Salinas (1980) point out that, d i e the intracity hedonic model, which only considers changes in residential propem values, the intercity model values site characteristics at the place of work as well. In addition, Clark and Nieves (1994) show that site characteristics that have broad regional economic effects may have relatively flat local impact gradients. Thus, intercity differentials in such site impacts may be more substantial than intracity effects. Furthermore, intercity hedonic models allow a wide range of environmental characteristics and facility types to be investigated simultaneously, facilitating a comparison of relative impacts. For those facility types exhibiting variation between and within cities, both models can be employed and the findings can be compared for consistency.
The intercity hedonic model has been fully developed elsewhere, (Blomquist et al. 1988; Roback 1982 Roback , 1988 ; Hoehn, Berger, and Blomquist 1987) so we present an abbreviated version of the model here." The intercity hedonic model is a general equiliirium model, which assumes perfect information, zero moving costs and, hence, perfect mobility on the part of both utility-maximizing households and cost-minimizing firms.
Since the focus of this model is on intercity variation, characteristics are assumed to be uniformly distributed within cities. Households maximize utility, which is derived from the consumption of a composite good 0, land @), and location-specific amenities and disamenities (A). This maximization is subject to the available budget, determined by the wage, W. The price of land is R, and the composite good price is assigned a value equal to unity.
MaxU = U(X,D;A)
subject to W = X+R*D Spatial equilibrium for households requires constant utility across space, and the indirect utility function defines that constant utility level, V', as a functian of the composite good price, wages, land prices, and the amenity offerings across locations. The intercity model derives the indirect utility function by substituting the optimizing levels of land, Dg and the composite good, X ' , into the utility function.
Spatial equilibrium for households is described in Figure 1 by a constant utility surface 0 in wagelrent space. For the sake of illustration, consider the effect of an increase in a disamenity level, such as air pollution, which results in higher costs for firms as a result of more stringent regulation in regions with lower air quality. An increase in air pollution in a particular location will shift the constant utility surface down and to the right (V, to VJ since the price residents will be willing to pay for land will decrease, and at the same time, they will require higher wages to compensate for increases in the disamenity.
Firms are also assumed to minimize the cost of production subject to the available technology. We assume that f m s operate in competitive input and output markets, and that production takes place under constant returns-to-scale technology.
Minimize C = (W,L,D,R;A)
subject to X = X(L,D;A) (9 Solving the equation system (4)- (5) for optimal values of labor and land (D?, and substituting those values back into the cost function (4), yields the unit cost function. When f m s are in spatial equilibrium, wages and land rents adjust so as to maintain costs at some constant level (set equal to the price of good X in the competitive output market). Thus, given some disamenity level, there exists a tradeoff between W and R which maintains unit costs (Le., C1 in Figure 1 ).
= C(W,R;A)
If increases in the the disamenity increase production cost, then the unit cost function s& inward (C, to C2 in Figure 1 ) as f m s are able to pay less for labor and land while maintaining the unit cost level.
Simultaneously solving equations (3) and (6) for W and R is shown graphically by the intersection between the indirect utility function (V,) and the unit cost function (CJ. When the disamenity level rises, this moves the equilibrium location from point (R,,W,) to (R2,WJ. In this example, the increase in the disamenity unambiguously reduces the equiliirium rent level, but has an uncertain effect on the wage.' Roback (1982) and Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) derive the implicit price for a disamenity (P) as the weighted sum of the joint impact of the disamenity on wages and rents:
The fraction of income spent on land is represented by k,, so the expenditure on land (W*Q provides the weight on the land-rent component of the implicit price. The following section derives reduced-form hedonic wage and land-rent functions for both owners and renters. These functions are then used to derive implicit price estimates for various location-specific attributes, and the findings are compared for the two g~o u p s .~
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF NOXIOUS FACILITY IMPACTS

Data
A data base is developed that combines individual data on housing values and wages with various regional attributes. Individual data from the 1980 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) are defined separately for home owners and renters. To implicitly value noxious facilities, a unique data set is constructed for eight different facility types. The selection of study sites was a multistage process starting with the choice of a range of facility types that present different physical hazard risks to the surrounding population.
The facility categories include three different types of power generating plants: nuclear, coal-fired, and gasand oil-fired. We also include military chemical weapons storage facilities slated for decommissioning, hazardous waste sites: petrochemical refineries, and liquefied natural gas storage facilities. The final category a of noxious facilities is non-operational radioactive-contaminated sites managed by the U.S. Department of Energy. For the various facility types, all facilities located in the study areas are included in the data set.
The second stage involved selection of PUMS units to create a sample that is spatially representative, covering a full range of site characteristics. Although some of the PUMS geographic identifiers cover relatively small subcounty areas, others consist of multiple-county groupings which may cover a large geographic area. Thus, a goal of the sample selection is to choose sites that constitute a geographic area small enough so that average amenity levels within that area are representative for the resident population. In a few cases where a region and facility type could be represented by two alternative county groupings of substantially differing area, the smaller county grouping was chosen. Finally, PUMS county groupings composed of noncontiguous geographical areas, or regions covering more than 10, OOO mi2 were dropped from the analysis.
Study areas in the final sample range from 22 to 7,218 mi2, with a median area of approximately 900 mi2 and a mean area of approximately 1,500 mi2. Only five of the areas exceed 4000 mi2 and these larger areas are sparsely populated localities in the West. The resulting sample consists of 76 PUMS study areas, of which 70 contain 262 noxious facility sites. The areal density of many of these types of facilities generally increases with population density. The distribution of the study facilities among the nine Census Divisions is shown in Table I . The Middle Atlantic region contains the largest number of facilitjes (78), due primarily to the number of hazardous waste sites identified in these states. The distribution of most facility types reflects the distribution of the total population of facilities among the regions.
Model Overview
Reduced-form wage and property value or rental expenditure equations are given by equations (8) and (9) Data from several sources are assembled to construct a data set that covers wage and property markets, local amenities, fiscal variables, and the socio-economic structure. All of the data are for 1979-80.
Data for wages, residential property values, and the range of associated individual attributes needed for a hedonic analysis are taken from the PUMS.
The samples of home owners and of renters used to estimate the annual wage equations are composed of those 18 years and older who report wage and salary income or nonfarm self-employment income. The sample is confined to workers who earn calculated wages in excess of $2.00 per hour, who both live and work in one of the study sites, and for whom occupation is identified. Because %e PUMS income data distribution is censored, we choose to truncate the sample by omitting those observations in the income category which are "$75,000 and up". This implies that the implicit price estimates will only be representative for the non- The remaining data are taken from numerous sources, as noted in Table 11, for a city or county in the region. In all cases, the county and city data that geographically to the PUMS data unit for each study site are selected.
Wage Models
and are typically defined most closely correspond Annual wages or earnings are d e w as the Summation of annual wages and self-employment income (ANNWAGE). The vector of human capital and industry characteristics (HC&IND) included are listed in Table II . In addition, two sets of dummy variables represent the occupation and industry of the worker.
A comparision of the human capital as well as other characteristics of the renter and owner samples is presented in Table III . W e education levels are similar, renters are approximately 4.5 years younger than owners. In addition, renters are more likely to be nonmarried, and slightly less likely to be white or to be a military veteran. Concerning geographic location, renters are more likely to reside in central city locations, and less likely to live in rural counties than are owners. Finally, there is a marked difference in observed mobility of the two groups. On average, renters have moved within the last 4 years, whereas the average time since the last move is almost 14 years for home owners.
Housing Value and Rent Expenditure Models
The annualized land value component of housing value (ANNVALUE) is derived from the owner's estimate of the market value of the residence and, in the case of renters, is derived from annual rent (ANNRENT), which is defined as gross rent including utilities'. The variable YRMOVED, which is the time period since moving into the house, is used to capture the mobility of the individual. However, it should be noted that it may also serve as a proxy for accuracy in the valuation of the residence by owners, since it can be expected that those who have purchased most recently w i l l provide the most accurate value estimates.
Structural characteristics (STRUCT) of the housing unit are controlled using several measures which are listed in Table II . Condominium status is controlled using a dummy variable (CONDO) in the owners' model. In the renters' model, CONDO is omitted and three other variables are included. These are a dummy for multi-unit building type (LOWRISE), a dummy for the presence of an elevator (ELEVATOR), and the number of separate units at a given address (UNITS).
Equations (8) and (9) share many of the same variables. Before discussing the differences, the common variables are briefly reviewed. The PRICE category contains a cost-of-living index (COLWEX) computed, with the cost of housing omitted, to account for the relative cost of produced goods. The DISEQ category is included to control for the possibility of temporary disequilibrium conditions. This category includes the unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY) and regional dummy variables representing the nine Census Divisions. In the wage model, it includes the percentage of the labor force that is unionized (PCTUNION), and, in the housing model, it includes the percentage of year-round housing units that are unoccupied (VACANCY). Percentage unionized is included in the disequilibrium category in recognition of the role of unions in maintaining higher r e m to human capital than would be found under equilibrium conditions.
Amenities (AMENITY) are related to safety, climatic, environmental, and recreational conditions in the region. Several measures are used to control for climatic variation, including the average annd percent of available sunlight (PCTSUN), the average annual inches of precipitation (PRECIP), the average wind speed (AVGWIND), the difference between the average mean daily July and January temperature (TEMPDIFF), the average total cooling-degreedays (COOLDAY S), and total heatingdegreedays (HEATDAYS). The variable for total suspended particulates (TSP) approximates air quality in the region. This measure was selected because it is strongly implicated in major health effects and diminished visibility, and is moderately correlated with sulfate levels. A dummy variable representing coastal areas (COAST) serves as a proxy for water-based recreational amenities. Amenities and disamenities associated with urban scale are proxied by population density (POPDENS) and, in the housing model, by dummy variables defining the metropolitan status of the county (CNTRLCTY, RURAL) as well. Location in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) but outside of the central city is the reference case. Access to employment is proxied by mean travel time (MEANTRAV) for each study site. The effects of industrial concentration (e.g., congestion, pollution) are controlled by the percent of total employment comprised by manufacturing workers (PCTMANUF) and the violent crime rate (VCRIME) represents the public safety amenity.
A group of taxand expenditure-related variables are included to control for differences in fiscal conditions. Local governmental expenditures ($lOOO) per capita (LOCEXPPC) is the sum of outlays for health, welfare, police services, and education. As such, it may proxy the level of local government services.
Local tax revenues ($lOOO) per capita (LOCTAXPC) which are drawn from property taxes and miscellaneous other sources are included to reflect the local tax burden. Intergovernmental transfers ($lOOO) per capita (NTRGOVPC) indicate the degree to which local expenditures are supported by nonlocal sources. Finally, the marginal state tax rate for the median income category in 1980 (MGSTATAX) is included to reflect interstate differences in tax burden.
Noxious facilities are modeled in terms of the density per lo00 mi2 of each type of facility in each PUMS data unit. Density is used to standardize the impact measure because of the large range of areal dimex?!hs covered by the PUMS units. Intracity studies of noxious facility impacts have generally employed distance measures to identlfy impact gradients. Such an approach does not permit detection of broad area impacts, which may extend beyond the assumed impact distances; the density measure does. In additon, the density mezsure more accurately characterizes areas with multiple facilities at varying distances from any given residence or work location.
Facilities included in the study were either in operation or, in the case of a few large coal (COAL) and nuclear (NUCLEAR) plants, in the final stages of construction by 1980. Gas-and oil-fired (GASOIL) plants are treated as a single category because in many cases both fuels are used at the same plant location.
The radioactive industrial sites (RADCON) have residual contamination from materials produced for the Manhattan Project or subsequent projects and are not associated with any ongoing operations. All of the chemical hazardous waste sites (HAZWASTE) are listed on the National Priorities List of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites known as Superfund, that was established by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. While they existed in 1980, public information about them may have been quite limited since they were not yet identified as Superfund sites when the PUMS data were collected. Two commercial radioactive waste disposal sites are also grouped in the HAZWASTE category.
The liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities include both storage and terminal installations. Petroleum refineries (REFINERY) and chemical weapons storage sites (CHEMDMIL) are the remaining facility categories.
EMPIRICALFINDINGS
Estimated Hedonic Model Coefficients
Before discussing the estimated implicit p i~e s , we briefly examine the regression coefficients for both owners' and renters' models, presented in Table IV .
I. I . Human Capital and Structural Characteristics
Coefficients on variables measuring human capital characteristics for owners and renters are typically of the expected sign and significant. Moreover, a comparison of the owner and renter models reveals that coefficients are highly similar. In no case were the estimated coefficients of opposite sign and statistically significant for both models. The only large difference was for the variable measuring marital status, where the income differential for married workers who owned their homes was nearly four times that of renters.
The findings on housing structural characteristics are also typically as expected, and frequently statistically significant. However, the similarities are not as striking as they are for the human capital variables. This is not surprising, since quality differences are likely between owner-occupied and rental
properties. In most cases where coefficients are statistically SignXcant in both equations, the owner premium exceeds that of renters.
I . 2. Price, Disequilibrium, and Location Dummy Variables
Few of the price or disequilibrium control variables have significant Coefficients in either of the income models. Of these variables, the only two that are significant in the renters' income model are also 
Fiscal and Amenity Variables
Similar to the findings on price and disequilibrium variables, most of the si@icant coefficients on fiscal and amenity variables occur in the housing models indicating greater capitalization of these features into land than into labor prices. However, in the income equations, the annual income of owners is higher for locations where values of LQCEXPPC, VCRIME, and TSP are high, and where PRECIP is low. Only PCTMANUF and TSP have signrficant influences on renters' income, both increasing annual income levels.
In the housing models, most of the fiscal characteristics are statistically significant although signs sometimes M e r for owners and renters. Increases in local taxes per capita decrease owners' housing values while they increase renters'. Likewise, per capita local government expenditures increase annualized housing values for owners, but decrease annual rents. These differences may reflect variations in the distribution of expenditures and benefits among renters and owners. Only the measure of intergovernmental transfers per capita has a consistent, negative effect for both groups.
All of the amenity variables are significant in the owners' housing equation versus four in the renters'.
A n m d expenditures on housbg by owner occupants are significantly increased by increases in HEATDAYS, COOLDAYS, AVGWIND, PCTSUN, and POPDENS. Owners' annual expenditures are significantly diminished by increases in PRECIP, TEMPDIFF, COMMUTE, VCRIME, PCTMANUF, and TSP. For renters, higher average commuting times (COMMUTE) increase annual rents, while increases in PRECIP, COOLDAYS, and TSP decrease annual rents.
Noxious Facility Variables
Though only the NUCLEAR power plant and REFINERY variables have significant coefficients in both the owners' and renters' income models, all of the noxious facility variables are ConsistentIy signed in the two income models, except the GASOIL power plant variable. In both models, the significant variables indicate that noxious facilities are generally associated with a wage premium. The consistency in coefficients between models is not as pronounced in the housing models. All facility coefficients are signifcant in the owners' housing model, but only four are in the renters'. Of those four, GASOIL and LNG have the same sign in both models, while NUCLEAR and RADCON do not. Overall, noxious facilities appear to have the effect of depressing values of owner-occupied housing but of increasing annual rents.
Estimated Implicit Prices
Once the hedonic wage and hwsing expenditure equations are estimated, implicit prices for local characteristics can be derived for each study site, using Equation 7. Impacts of an area characteristic on wages and housing values may be either offsetting or reinforcing so a measure of the net effect is necessary. Mean values for these implicit price estimates are reported in Table V . So that the reader may judge the reliability of the estimates, we summarize the sign and significance levels for the income and housing expenditure variable coefficients for each model. We also report the mean value of the variable, and the s h p l e correlation (across the study sites) of the implicit prices for home owners versus renters. In general, correlations between the two prices are strong and positive, typically exceeding 0.9. However, no clear pattern emerges when comparing the magnitude of prices for owners versus renters. In discussing the implicit price estimates, we focus on those which are derived from significant coefficients.
Price, Disequilibrium, and Location Dummy Variables
Increases in the unemployment rate have a negative impact for both owners and renters. Coastal location also has a negative value, though neither result is based on significant coefficients in both income and housing models. In contrast, an increased cost of living has negative value for owners (based on two significant coefficients) but positive for renters (based on only one sisnificant coefficient).
Fiscal and Amenity Variables
Per capita measures of local taxes and of local spending have negative implicit prices. For local taxes, the negative price is almost four times higher for renters than owners, while the implicit prices for local expenditures are nearly equivalent. In contrast, intergovernmental transfers have positive implicit prices for both owners and renters. Although many of the wage and income model coefficients that form the basis for fiscal variable implicit prices are statistically significant, the price estimates are unreasonably large. For example, while it may not be surprising to see negative implicit prices on local taxes or local spending (given that the latter includes redistributive spending such as welfare), we would not expect to see implicit price estimates exceeding the incremental per capita tax or spending level.
To conserve space, we examine only those implicit prices on amenities which are derived from at least one sigruficant coefficient in both the renter and owner models. Ccncentrations of manufacturing employment and total suspended particulates have more negative implicit prices for renters than owners. By contrast, commuting has a more negative value for owners. This may reflect the fact that owners are less likely to live in the central city, and hence are more likely to commute longer distances. Residental location may also affect the higher implicit prices of renters for manufacturing employment and total suspended particulates since air quality is Wically superior in suburban as compared to urban locations. Of the climatic variables, only two (precipitation and coolingdegreedays) display significant coefficients for both owners and renters. In both cases, the implicit prices are positive and are larger for owners.
No.xi0u.s Facility Variables
Signs on implicit prices for each type of noxious facility are the same for the owner and renter samples though values differ by a factor of ten in some cases. Results are most robust for nuclear plants, which have significant coefficients in all four models and also have similar values for owners and renters. The next strongest results are for petrochemical refineries and LNG terminals, which both have signifcant coefficients in three models and also have similar values. We have the least confidence in the results for coal-fxed plants, hazardous waste sites, and the chemical weapons sites because 1) they have no significant coefficients in the renters' models and only one in the owners', 2) the implicit price for chemical weapons sites is based on six relatively sparsely popdated areas, and 3) the hazardous waste sites had not yet received Superfund publicity at the time of data collectim in 1980.
Implicit Price Differences, Demographic Characteristics, and Mobility
Given the differences between renters and owners shown in Table 111 , a relevant question is whether the observed disparity between the implicit prices for owners and renters is primarily due to demographics, mobility, or structural differences in the wage and housing regression results. To investigate this, we substitute pooled mean demographic and mobility characteristics for those of the separate owner and renter samples" and recalculate the implic;+ prices using the regression coefficients for the separate samples. In absolute value, implicit prices based on the pooled characteristics are generally higher for renters and lower for ownerslZ than when calculated using renters' and owners' own characteristics. than 2% due to the s~bStitUt0n.~~ The changes due to the differential mobility of the two groups, as measured by the time period since the last move, is much smaller. When pooled mobility characteristics are substituted for owners' characteristics, implicit prices are on average virtually unchanged, and renters' prices fall by only 0.2%.
Although observed differences in demographic characteristics appear to explain some of the difference between owners' and renters' implicit prices for noxious facilities, they only account for a small portion of the w i t y . this suggests that other differences between owners and renters must account for the differences in in implicit price estimates.
CONCLUDING REMARK3
Attepts are often made to compensate local residents when certain types of noxious facilities are sited in their vicinity. However, determining the appropriate level of compensation for a diverse group of local residents is difficult. For example, previous studies have found significant differences in risk perception dependii on the age, sex, presence of young children, and housing tenure of individuals. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the differences in valuation of noxious facilities for home owners versus renters using an intercity hedonic model. Though we find that owners and renters are generally consistent in their positive or negative valuation of envirolmental features, this should not be misconstrued as suggesting that implicit prices are the Same for the two grmps. Indeed, for some variables, the magnitudes of implicit price estimates vary substantially across models (although they tend to move together as indicated by relatively high correlations between owners' a d renters' prices). The disparities appear to be the result of different responses to community characteristics and environmental features on the part of owners and renters. Differences in the mobility of the two groups account for less than one percent of the differences between owners and renters implicit valuations on average, while variations in demographic characteristics explain between two percent and five percent of the divergence. The remaining differences are due to the unique model-coefficients estimated for the two groups which may reflect differences in underlying preferences and risk perception. , , nor does it reduce productivity as in the example above). In that case, increases in the disamenity decrease rents and increase wages. If the disamenity increases productivity, then wages rise unambiguously, but the impact on rents depends on the relative strengths of the shifts in the unit cost and indirect utility functions.
ES Central
6. The assumption of regional equilibrium underlying this model has been called into question recently.
See recent papers by Hunt, (1993) Harrigan and McGregor, (1993) Graves and Mueser, (1993) Schachter and Althaus, (1993) and Evans (1993), for example. Furthermore, Greenwood, Hunt, Rickman, and Treyz (1991) , and Herzog and Schlottmann (1993) show that willingness-to-pay estimates can be derived as the wage premium required to prevent outmigration. Since we are concerned with both the wage and property value effects of noxious facilities, this approach is not used. Instead, we control for regional disequilibrium by including regional dummy variables and specific control variables, such as the vacancy rate in the housing models, and the unemployment rate in the income models. However, it is recognized that the implicit prices derived may differ from the true willingness to pay to the extent that disequilibrium remains uncontrolled.
7. The hazardous waste category is mainly composed of Superfund sites. In addion, this category includes two operating, commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities.
8.An additional issue is raised by Herzog and Schlottmann (1993) regarding the matching of annual earnings to location. Since the earnings data is reported as the total for 1979, and since some workers have relocated over the time period, it is possible that the 1980 residence is not the residence at which those earnings took place. To address this problem, Herzog and Schlottmann choose to drop all movers from the sample. We choose to retain them, but we acknowledge the possibility of an errors-in-variables problem which could also bias our findings. Indeed, the Same mismatch may be present in the occupational classification and the industry classification, since those measures are also defined for 1980 as L opposed to 1979. However, given that movers can be considered the marginal workers i n the labor i.
' -G market, we believe that dropping them from the sample would generate a potentially serious bias in the estimate of implicit prices.
9.
For owners, we follow Roback (1982) and assume that 19.6% of housing expenditure is devoted to land. However, since Roback's estimate is derived from a sample of owners, and since we were unable to identify a corresponding value estimated from a sample of rental properties, we tested the sensitivity of the implicit price estimates for renters to this assumption of the land share component. Increasing the land share by 40% to 27.4% (Le., 0.274=0.196*1.4) typically changed implicit price estimates by less than 1 %. The notable exceptions are coal-fired plants whose implicit prices rose by 10% on average, and gasand oil-fired plants, whose prices rose 42% on average. Note that both of these types of power plants had relatively low implicit prices, ranging from 1-2% of those for nuclear plants.
1 0 . Intercity hedonic models typically assume that labor markets are national in scope, while housing markets are local or regional. This general pattern of significance (Le., statistically signifiw%.. disequilibrium controls in the hedonic housing models, and insignificant disequilibrium controls in the hedonic income models) is consistent with that assumption.
11. The mean of the pooled renter and owner sample of workers for each site was used to derive the demographic values which were then substituted into the respective wage equations.
12,
In no case did an implicit price change sign as a result of substituting pooled demographic and/or mobility characteristics for individual levels. Thus, for example when implicit prices for renters' rise in absolute value terms, this implies that negative values become more negative and positive values more positive. Furthermore, when owners' implicit prices are shown to decrease, this means that negative values become less negative, and positive prices less positive.
.-
p .
A c 13. An exception is for chemical weapons storage facilities whose implicit price fell over 10% when owners' were assigned pooled sociodemographic characteristics. Note however that this price is unexpectedly positive, resulting from a positive, albeit insignificant coefficient in the hedonic wage regression. Thus, since the positive wage component of the implicit price dominated the negative land rent component, the change in the demographic characteristics which leads to lower predicted wages for owners, has a relatively strong negative effect on the implicit price.
